

AYELET PEER, Hear No Evil? The Manipulation of Words of Sounds and Rumours in Julius Caesar's *Commentaries*, in: Annemarie Ambühl (ed.), *Krieg der Sinne – Die Sinne im Krieg. Kriegsdarstellungen im Spannungsfeld zwischen antiker und moderner Kultur / War of the Senses – The Senses in War. Interactions and Tensions Between Representations of War in Classical and Modern Culture = thersites 4* (2016), 43-76.

KEYWORDS

Julius Caesar, *Commentarii, Bellum Gallicum, Bellum Civile*, Sound, Battle Descriptions

ABSTRACT (English)

In recent years, we have witnessed how scholars have re-read and re-examined Caesar's commentaries on the Gallic and Civil wars, focusing more on the works' literary merits. In this contribution to the discussion I aim to show how Caesar deploys the motif of hearing to develop his narrative of battle description. Therefore I single out specific words denoting sound such as shouting (*clamor*), voices (*vox*), and also the use of rumours (*rumor, fama*). Caesar probably wished to give his audience a fuller, engaging portrayal of the battlefield, along with its dangers and terrors, so that we, his readers, are able not only to see through the general's eyes, but also to hear the sounds of war. Sounds are thus significant in conveying the tense atmosphere of war, especially since soldiers are naturally frightened by what they cannot see, but only hear. Yet in this chaos of shouts and voices Caesar would have us remember that only one voice can ease the fears of the soldiers and restore order: the voice of the commander, *imperator* Caesar.



ABSTRACT (German)

In den letzten Jahren hat die Forschung Caesars *Commentarii* zum Gallischen Krieg und zum Bürgerkrieg neu untersucht und den Schwerpunkt vermehrt auf die literarischen Verdienste der Werke gelegt. In meinem Beitrag zu dieser Diskussion möchte ich zeigen, wie Cäsar das Motiv des Hörens verwendet, um Kriege und Schlachten zu beschreiben. Dazu greife ich bestimmte Wörter aus seinen Berichten heraus, die Töne oder Klänge bezeichnen, wie Geschrei (*clamor*), Stimmen (*vox*) und Gerüchte (*rumor, fama*). Caesar wollte höchstwahrscheinlich seinem Publikum eine lebendige und fesselnde Schilderung des Geschehens auf dem Schlachtfeld geben und auch von den damit verbundenen Gefahren und Schrecken erzählen, damit wir, die Leser, nicht nur durch die Augen des Feldherrn sehen, sondern auch die Geräusche des Krieges hören können. Gerade die akustische Dimension ist dabei von großer Bedeutung, um die Atmosphäre des Krieges zu vermitteln, zumal Soldaten von Natur aus Angst haben vor dem, was sie nicht sehen, sondern nur hören können. Doch inmitten dieses Chaos von Schreien und Stimmen will Caesar uns daran erinnern, dass nur eine Stimme die Ängste beschwichtigen und die Ordnung wiederherstellen kann, nämlich die Stimme des *imperator* Caesar.



Hear No Evil? The Manipulation of Words of Sounds and Rumours in Julius Caesar's *Commentaries*

Ayelet Peer (Tel Aviv)

I. Introduction

In his well-known book on military history, John Keegan compares the commander's and the soldier's perception of battle. He claims that for the commander, a battle is more organized, with "intellectually manageable blocks of human beings going here or there and doing, or failing to do, as he directs. The soldier is vouchsafed no such well-ordered and clear-cut vision. Battle, for him, takes place in a wildly unstable physical and emotional environment."¹

While we may argue for this clear-cut dichotomy, we cannot ignore the fact that the battlefield is mayhem, whether in ancient or modern times. So how can such chaos be described in mere words? Can grammar and syntax give a close-to-real feeling of a battle fought? In other words, how can you describe a battle? Ancient battle descriptions (like modern ones) vary from author to author, as they represent each writer's agenda and literary tendencies. As J.E. Lendon rightly states, "no one is born able to describe what happens in a battle, and the experience of battle does not in itself supply the necessary language."²

This 'necessary language' is the focus of this paper, more precisely understanding Julius Caesar's chosen language for his battle descriptions in the *Bellum Gallicum* (BG) and *Bellum Civile* (BC) commentaries. I wish to centre on a specific element of the rhetoric and semantics of battle descriptions in Caesar's commentaries: human sounds. Caesar's commentaries have garnered fresh interest in recent years; I wish to contribute to this renewed scholarship by showing how Caesar invigorates battle descriptions by accentuating the sense of hearing; how he employs

* I heartily thank Annemarie Ambühl and Christian Stoffel for their insights and enlightening comments on the first draft of this paper.

1 Keegan (1976) 46.

2 Lendon (1999) 274.

clamours, voices, and rumours more fully to convey the battlefield and differentiate Romans from Gauls, Caesareans from Pompeians.³

When studying battle descriptions historians tend to concentrate on the strategy, the commands, and the forms of fighting.⁴ Yet what more do battles consist of? Battles, as we have mentioned, are chaotic events; as Lendon continues, “For the soldier the raw experience of battle is one of sights, noises, terrors, and alimentary misadventures. But when he mentally files those experiences ... he is already ensorcelled by the inherited rhetoric of battle description.”⁵ Lendon here accentuates how a raw experience is reined in by the discipline of rhetoric, how language can shape an historical event: in other words, how battle descriptions are formed from an experience of battle. Sounds form an inevitable part of every campaign. As Christina Kraus notes regarding the *BG*, “the narrative rustles with talk, conferences, letters, announcements, reports, cries, commands, weeping, bustle, turmoil, insults and shouts.”⁶ Lendon and Kraus aver that a battle is a mixture of sights, sounds and motion, the literary combination of which contributes to a richer battle description.

My aim here is not to survey all the different sounds (or their effects) that are mustered in the commentaries. In fact, Caesar scarcely (if at all) mentions noises apart from human sounds (shouts, cries, etc.); only once does he specifically associate noise with a weapon of war. This is when he describes the particular chariot-warfare of the Britons in *BG* IV. The rattle of the chariots’ wheels (*strepitu rotarum*: *BG* 4,33,1)⁷ adds to the terror caused by the warriors’ hurling missiles in every direction while driving hither and

3 Lendon (1999) 277 writes: “Caesar’s battle descriptions are not works of fiction, but attempts to reduce the chaos of reality to understandable narrative, perhaps favorable to himself and his men. For this he necessarily relies upon preconceived models for interpreting his and his army’s experience of combat. He makes use of pre-existing schemes, however implicit, about how battles work.”

4 For example, Steinwender (1915) on the tactics and formations used by the cohorts, Keegan’s (1976) book mentioned above, or more recently Sabin (2000), who focuses on infantry combat.

5 Lendon (1999) 274.

6 Kraus (2010) 250 explores the use of voice and silence, especially in the speeches narrated in the *BG*.

7 Kraus (2010) 250. The references and quotes from the *BG* refer to the Oxford edition by Du Pontet (1900).

thither.⁸ Therefore I thought it apt to highlight the sounds Caesar does mention—mainly shouts. In battle there is a mixture of all kinds of noises: the clash of arms, screams of the wounded, war cries. I argue that in his commentaries Caesar deliberately uses shouts, mainly cries of attack or of panic, at strategic points in his narratives. He uses these semantic landmarks to signpost the turn of events, for better or for worse.

When considering the literary merits of the commentaries, we must bear in mind that they form a unique niche within Roman historiography. Caesar's commentaries have won honourable status in Latin literature. They are hardly 'naked' narratives, as Cicero dubbed them;⁹ they are ornamented, but differently from Cicero's elegant turns of phrase. The down-to-earth tone Caesar is so renowned for is precisely what makes his descriptions so piercing.¹⁰ Caesar was not writing a lengthy history, *ab urbe condita*, yet his work cannot be regarded as nothing but a dry military report. The commentaries on the Gallic and civil wars are literary prose covering the *gestae* of their general-author. Caesar deliberately chose the *commentarius* genre, alluding to an ancient practice; the genre's limits, especially its brevity, best suited his literary taste and talent.¹¹

This terseness is also evident in his battle descriptions. Caesar is known for preferring a specific and more limited vocabulary for his commentaries.¹² So when he does specify a special sound (by using a particular noun or verb), it could mean that he wishes to accentuate it or what it symbolizes. What kind of battles Caesar describes is open to interpretation. His literary persona, the purple-cloaked *imperator* Caesar is always at his best, always saves the day. If we consider Lendon's above quote, Caesar's real battle

8 In *BG* 7,61 Labienus fools the Gauls by strategically moving his legions across the river. The Gauls reported hearing the sound of oars (*sonitumque remorum*), yet these were not vehicles of war like the chariots in Britain, just transport vehicles.

9 In the famous passage from the *Brutus* (262): *nudi enim sunt, recti et venusti, omni ornatu orationis tamquam veste detracta*.

10 Pelling (1981) 741; Brown (1999) 330; Osgood (2009) 351–352. For more references on Caesar's unique prose see Peer (2015) 6–7.

11 On the *commentarius* genre and Caesar's use of it see Peer (2015) 2–4.

12 As Garcea (2012) 9 notes: "in order that speech may attain clarity, he calls for an extremely selective *dilectus uerborum* in relation to any word that might risk creating an obstacle to the transparency of the message as a result of its antiquated, non-standard, or new nature...". Caesar wanted his Latin to be as understandable and as lucid as possible. See also Hall (1998) 23; Fantham (2009) 148–151. A good example is also Caesar's use of words denoting death or killing, as Opelt (1980) demonstrates.

experiences became means and tools for the rhetoric of his battle descriptions. This served diverse purposes in the commentaries.

The two types of commentaries Caesar wrote differ in their battle descriptions. Writing about foreign battles, he could allow himself to expand with more detailed descriptions of the fleeing Gauls, who are caught and killed mercilessly.¹³ Yet such descriptions are considerably mellowed when he writes about fighting Pompey's Roman legions in the *Bellum Civile*. Either way, Caesar does not fight sterile battles. He may have matchless insight and stratagem, yet *fortuna* or his soldiers do not always adhere to his intentions. His battles leave casualties, wounded, victors, vanquished. And there are shouts—of agony or resolve. Caesar's genius is revealed in his battle plans, but also in his ability to overcome defeat, to learn from his mistakes.

Our analysis of Caesar's use of *clamor*, *vox*, and *fama* will demonstrate how the description of various sounds helps Caesar accentuate his role as a commander. And from a literary point of view we must also bear in mind that the commentaries of Caesar the author were probably meant to be read aloud to different crowds.¹⁴ The accentuation of shouts in different parts of the battle creates a sense of intensity and tension. It builds up the drama of the story, hence magnifies Caesar's triumphs against great odds.¹⁵

II. Sounds of battle in the *BG* and *BC*

Caesar is the omnipotent *imperator* of the Gallic campaign, a fact firmly established throughout the narrative. Yet he is also the all-knowing narrator,¹⁶ depicting the battles in hindsight. This dual position allows Caesar to build the narratives of the fights he participated in as he wishes, by emphasizing the elements he chooses. Accordingly it is significant to observe which scenes Caesar highlights and which words he incorporates in his descriptions.

Note too that Caesar often tries to depict well-balanced battles. There are descriptions of Caesarean defeats in the commentaries (most notable are Gergovia and Dyrrachium) as well as triumphs. The depiction of the battle

13 For example during the battle of the Sabis or the siege of Avaricum.

14 On the audience of the commentaries see Peer (2015) 5–7.

15 On Caesar's use of dramatic rhetoric in his dealings with Gauls and Germans see Ramage (2001) 152–154, 161–165.

16 On Caesar the omnipresent narrator of the *Bellum Civile* see Grillo (2011).

also greatly hinges on whom Caesar is fighting—perhaps the stronger the foe the sweeter the victory. This is where Caesar the author steps in. He wishes to create an engaging story, especially in the *BG*, which depicts Roman might against barbarian ferocity. We must always bear in mind that Caesar was not fighting (and writing) in a political vacuum; he needed to justify his expedition to Gaul against fierce opposition in Rome.¹⁷ As a Roman proconsul, he also needed to accentuate the courage of the Roman legions, which could withstand, and defeat, even the most dangerous Gallic and Germanic attacks. Thus his use of shouts to signify surprise or panic also serves his purpose in showing how the Roman legions could recover from any defeat.

(1) clamor

The first word in the commentaries we shall review is *clamor*.¹⁸ In Latin it stands for various sounds, joy or pain, a battle cry or alarm.¹⁹ As we shall show, in the *BG* it denotes sudden onslaught (by either side) or panic. Shouts are inevitable parts of any attack, as Caesar specifically explains in his description of the battle of Pharsalus in *BC* III.²⁰ He also uses this specific word to indicate special features of Gallic behaviour. In an interesting contrast, although there are several usages of the word in the *BG*, it hardly appears at all in the *BC*. We shall discuss this difference later (II.1.e).

17 Caesar must present his Gallic campaign as *bellum iustum* for it to be considered a legitimate war. On how Caesar constructs his narrative to follow the reasons of *bellum iustum* see Ramage (2001). On the larger meaning of *bellum iustum* in connection with Livy see Drexler (1959). Timpe (1965) tries to track the ulterior motives behind the Gallic campaign. See also Cato's criticism of Caesar's conduct against the Tencteri and Usipetes: Powell (1998) 124–127.

18 To highlight the difference between the *BG* and the *BC* regarding Caesar's specific vocabulary, I chose to begin with examples from the *BG* and then show how the same words are used in the *BC*.

19 Caesar's commentaries, as noted, form a unique genre within Latin literature. Therefore I shall limit the investigation of *clamor* to his works. Since we only possess fragments of Cato's and Ennius' works, it is very difficult to survey the use of *clamor* in Latin historiography and historical epic prior to Caesar. Erbig (1931) 24, for example, mentions only one usage of *clamor* in Ennius and several usages in the *Aeneid*, which are irrelevant to our present discussion.

20 *BC* 3,92,5. This passage is discussed below (II.1.e).

Regarding the grammatical use of the word, Caesar is fond of the passive voice in combination with *clamor*. A shout is always raised or heard; no specific individual is described as raising it, even if the identity of whoever did so is known.²¹ At times he uses the deponent verb *oriri* in combination with *clamor*,²² but again, no definite individual shouts out. Thus Caesar maintains the air of confusion which often dominates the battlefield. Voices are heard but their origin is unknown. All the soldiers can do is follow them or beware of them.

Ignorance of the source of the shouts is ambiguous and could be made to serve as a form of psychological warfare in battle. Caesar specifically refers to the mental effect of such shouts: at the battle of Alesia, when clamours from behind the fighting line frightened the Roman soldiers (*multum ad terrendos nostros valet clamor*: BG 7,84,4), Caesar offers an explanation: “for in general, all things that are far away alarm the minds of people even more vehemently.”²³ In this general observation, Caesar refers to the unidentified shouts as a strange and terrifying element—precisely due to its remoteness. The fighting soldiers cannot tell where the shouts are coming from, they cannot see who is shouting; they just hear the distant voices. So they are struck with fear about the causes of the shouting: their comrades might be losing, the enemy drawing close. The unknown causes the greatest fear in battle. It is the commander’s task to re-establish order in the army to allay such unfounded alarm. We shall see a fine example of this in the description of the battle at the Sabis (II.1.b).

(a) Tribal shouting – clamor as a Gallic feature

21 In BG 5,43,3, on the seventh day of the siege by the Nervii of Cicero’s camp they suddenly stormed it with a great shout (*maximo clamore*). This is the only time Caesar uses such an adjective to describe a battle cry. He does so to accentuate the danger the Romans faced and consequently their valour in this situation. In BG 7,12,5 the people of Cenabum raise a shout (*clamore sublato*) and arm themselves, hoping Vercingetorix will help them. Yet even when we know who raised the shout, the phrase is still given in the passive.

22 For example, in BG 2,24,3; 5,53,1; 7,47,4. But these are fewer usages.

23 *Omnia enim plerumque quae absunt vehementius hominum mentis perturbant* (BG 7,84,5). All translations are mine, unless otherwise indicated.

Before examining the use of *clamor* in Caesar's battle descriptions, let us briefly demonstrate how Caesar associates Gallic uncivilized manners with shouts.

In a particular instance, mentioned only once in the *BG*, Caesar notes that shouts are a customary manner of conduct for the Gauls: "for whenever a major and distinguished matter occurs, (the Gauls) notify it by a shout (*clamore*) through fields and territories; others successively pick it up and pass it to their neighbours."²⁴ This is a rare usage of *clamor* in the commentaries, not in a military setting. Another Gallic custom involves shouting and the clash of arms, as Caesar notes in *BG* 7,21,1 describing the approval of Vercingetorix's speech by the assembly of Gauls. Thus Caesar creates the impression of the Gauls as a loud, even raucous, people.

An interesting continuation of the Gallic manner of shouting is found in *BG* V. After the tragic loss of Sabinus and Cotta²⁵ and the troubles encountered by Quintus Cicero, with Caesar's help he manages to repel a large Gallic attack. The news soon reaches Labienus' camp and Caesar notes: "before midnight a shout arose at the gates of the camp, a shout which signified the victory and congratulations by the Remi to Labienus."²⁶ This is an interesting twist. The Gallic Remi raise a shout to commend the Romans on their triumph. This is the only clamour raised to congratulate the opposite side, and also the only one sounded after the fight and by none of its combatants. The Remi here exhibit the same Gallic conduct Caesar describes in *BG* 7,3,2, where he reports the Gallic transmission of news.

As mentioned, these are the rarer notations of *clamor*. The more prevalent usage is as follows.

(b) Shouts during the battle of the Sabis

The battle of the Sabis, the fierce combined onslaught by several Gallic tribes, is elaborately narrated in the second book of the *BG*, especially in chapters 19–28 (which describe the actual fighting), so it can be used as a case study for the myriad sounds one is subject to in battle. While this battle

24 *Nam, ubique maior atque inlustrior incidit res, clamore per agros regionesque significant; hanc alii deinceps excipiunt et proximis tradunt, ut tum accidit (BG 7,3,2).*

25 This incident is discussed below (II.3.a).

26 *...ante mediam noctem ad portas castrorum clamor oreretur, quo clamore significatio victoriae gratulatioque ab Remis Labieno fieret (BG 5,53,1).*

has been studied and analysed from a variety of perspectives,²⁷ I do not wish to examine the tactics or the progress of the fighting. My aim is to highlight only the specific use of certain shouts before, during, and in the aftermath of this battle.

As mentioned, Caesar is the all-powerful *imperator*. His *celeritas* is manifested by the swiftness of his marching legions, but also by his quick thinking; he cleverly (and promptly) apprehends and adapts to fluctuating situations. At the start of the Gallic attack Caesar soon realizes that the Gauls are moving swiftly in all directions. Yet Caesar the author makes sure that Caesar the commander does not interpret the hubbub of the situation as panic or alarm. In the following portrayal of the battle we can detect a very clear dichotomy (almost as if Caesar had read Keegan's words quoted above)²⁸ between the commander's composure and the soldiers' fright. Caesar, in a very orderly fashion, gives us a glimpse at the general's responsibilities prior to commencing battle. As he narrates:

Everything needed to be executed at the same time by Caesar: the flag to be displayed...the signal for the trumpet to be given; the soldiers to be recalled from the siege work; those who had advanced farther off in search of materials to be summoned, to draw up the battle line, to exhort the soldiers, to give the signal for battle.²⁹

Caesar had to recall and summon the men (*revocandi, arcessendi*); he had to give the signal to sound the trumpet (*tuba*),³⁰ to spur the soldiers on, and

27 For an analysis of this battle see also Pelling (1981) 747–749; Brown (1999); Lendon (1999) 317–320.

28 For Keegan (1976), however, Caesar's commentaries only convey a “strategocentric narrative” (74).

29 *Caesari omnia uno tempore erant agenda: vexillum proponendum...signum tuba dandum; ab opere revocandi milites; qui paulo longius aggeris petendi causa processerant arcessendi; acies instruenda; milites cohortandi; signum dandum* (BG 2,20,1). This passage is fairly typical of Caesar's style. Dixon/Dixon (1992) analyse a different passage from the BG, and argue (73): “this is a very typical way for Caesar to form a chunk: first the agent, in an emphatic position, then a sequence of actions he performs.” This structure creates emphasis on the agent and his actions (Caesar, in our passage).

30 Kraus (2010) 250 is right in noting that the trumpets are almost silent in the BG. They are referred to only thrice (and twice in the BC); see Meusel (1887) 2224. We might suppose that Caesar the linguist was not fond of this word, or maybe the sound of the trumpet obliterated the more important sounds he wished to emphasize in his narrative,

only then to give the signal to commence the battle. All these tasks involve sounds, blaring sounds, the general's orders being shouted and the sound of the trumpets. As the general, Caesar must make sure his soldiers not only see him (the flag being raised) but hear him too. His orders will make their fighting orderly amid the general battle frenzy.³¹ This passage accentuates the importance of different sounds from the commander's standpoint, for keeping the legion in the proper order. These are not random shouts or noises: every sound has a specific word. The commander does not mumble incoherently; he calls, he orders, he summons. His shouts are clear and purposeful. Furthermore, the most important type of shout is saved for the end: the exhortation of the soldiers (*cobortandi*) just before the battle. The use of asyndeton in describing this series of commands makes it appear as if Caesar was fighting a pitched battle and not a sudden Gallic incursion.

While Caesar detailed the necessities and gave the signal for battle, the fighting itself was already taking place in several places. The soldiers of the Ninth and Tenth legions had hurled their javelins and then breathlessly (*exanimatos*) chased the enemy to the river, slaying them with their swords (*BG* 2,23,1). Caesar describes the swiftness of the soldiers' reaction against the rapid-moving attack of the enemy. While sounds are not specifically expressed, the mention of the soldiers being breathless and the descriptions of the javelins and swords help the reader to add the corresponding sounds, the men's panting and the clatter of the weaponry. Thus Caesar creates a very noisy scene, even though he hardly uses specific words to represent sound. Yet within these background noises the soldiers themselves—from the description—are evidently relatively quiet. They are seemingly too exhausted to shout. They are not entirely silent as they are panting, but Caesar does not mention any other shouts. The behaviour of the inaudible

so he muted it. The human sounds were more important to him than the instrumental. In *BC* 2,35,6, there is also an interesting use of a trumpeter: after the Pompeian general Varus has been beaten by Curio, he deserts his camp and only leaves behind a few tents and a trumpeter, just for appearance's sake (*ad speciem*). Thus we see how a trumpet symbolizes the well-functioning camp. On the functions of the trumpet as a military instrument see Wille (1967) 84–90. Wille (86) mentions a quote from Cassius Dio (41,58,2) that Caesar and Pompey ordered the trumpeters to play at Pharsalus and sound the signal for battle. Caesar in the *BC* does not mention a *tuba*, he only writes that the sign for battle was given and that there was a universal shout (*BC* 3,92).

31 Kraus (2009) 167.

yet steadfast Ninth and Tenth legions thus stands in resounding contrast to the behaviour of the frightened soldiers to the rear.

Concurrent with this disorder near the river, another Roman unit was facing an attack on their camp. General commotion arose when some enemy fighters succeeded in penetrating it. Caesar describes the racket: “At the same time, among those who went with the baggage, shout and roaring (*clamor fremitusque*) arose; frightened, they raced in every direction.”³² In this passage *clamor* is used to signify the alarm that filled this part of the army. Caesar adds to the sense of fear by using the phrase *clamor fremitusque*, which accentuates that this is not a battle cry but shouts of fear and panic due to the surprise Gallic attack. Hearing the shouts and seeing the commotion, the auxiliaries in the Roman army flee home, announcing that the Romans have failed.³³

In these passages we have orderly commands (chapter 20), then the hard fighting itself (23) and simultaneously cries of terror (24). Caesar as the commander in chief must elevate himself above all these sounds to establish his authority over the frightened soldiers. In order to restore his men’s courage after the sudden onslaught, Caesar appears in person at the scene to hearten the men, calling the centurions by their names.³⁴ Thus a shout of distress is assuaged by reassurance and acknowledgment, and by the orders and exhortations spoken confidently by the general himself. From a literary point of view, Caesar completes a cycle of compositions: a scene which began with his methodical commands against a roaring onslaught ends likewise with his reassuring demeanour. During this fierce battle a cacophony of sounds could be heard, but the outcome is determined by which sound the soldiers will react to: the panicked shouts or the general’s encouraging commands. As Lendon astutely notes, “Caesar’s general must attend to the animus of his troops before, during, and after the battle.”³⁵ In the end, it was Caesar’s orders and Titus Labienus’ assistance (with the Tenth legion) that saved the troops.

Caesar chooses to end the narrative of the battle with a sound unusual for a fight—laughter. But the joke is at the Gauls’ expense. After

32 *Simul eorum qui cum impedimentis veniebant clamor fremitusque oriebatur, alique aliam in partem perterriti ferebantur* (BG 2,24,3).

33 I shall discuss rumours circulated during a battle below (II.4).

34 *Caesar ab decimae legionis cohortatione...centurionibusque nominatim appellatis...* (BG 2,25,1–2).

35 Lendon (1999) 297.

vanquishing the Nervii, the Romans moved against a stronghold of the Aduatuci, who were not familiar with the Roman siege tower (chapters 29–33): “When the entrenched Gauls saw in the distance the Roman tower, they were quick to laugh: first they laughed from atop the wall and loudly berated (the Romans)...”³⁶ But the Romans had the last laugh when their tower approached the wall, causing the Gauls to panic. In the consequent fighting, the Romans triumphed over their erstwhile overconfident foes.³⁷

From this analysis we may infer that the sudden clamour raised by the army (in chapter 24) was pivotal in the narrative, deliberately inserted by Caesar at this point. This does not mean that Caesar (the author) fabricated this moment—instead he built his narrative up for a dramatic climax with this shout. On the one hand it signified the dire straits in which the army found itself, the immense danger the troops faced. On the other, this shout was the start of the change in fortune for the Romans. Hearing their distress, Caesar came to their rescue and the battle took a positive turn.

(c) Other clamours in the BG

In the other books of the *BG* Caesar uses *clamor* to denote similar circumstances. We shall now review several examples.

During the campaign of P. Crassus in Aquitania, a shout from the side of the entrenchments (*clamore...sublato*: *BG* 3,22,4)³⁸ foils the plan of the Gallic Adiatunnus to launch a surprise attack, and the Romans rush to arms.³⁹ This time, the shout indicates warning or discovery of the intruders, not fear; nevertheless, it changes the course of events. In the ensuing battle Crassus’ men succeed in penetrating the enemy camp, when again a sudden shout is heard (*clamore...audito*) and the battle begins (*BG* 3,26,4). While in the first instance it was a war-cry raised by the Romans themselves, in the second the source of the shout was probably the Gauls, since the Romans only heard the shout—they did not raise it.

In a successful campaign against German tribes described in *BG* IV, it is the Germans who are alarmed in their camp in a scene similar to the

36 ...*primum irridere ex muro atque increpitare vocibus...* (*BG* 2,30,3).

37 Riggsby (2006) 75–76.

38 See also *BG* 7,48,1 when a sudden shout is heard by the Gauls.

39 In *BG* 6,8,6 a similar phrase (*clamore sublato*) is used to indicate the battle cry of Labienus’ troops.

aforementioned battle of the Sabis. The enemy is fear-stricken by the swift arrival of Caesar's troops. Caesar points out the signs of their terror: "their fear was indicated by uproar (*fremitu*) and running around."⁴⁰ For the Romans this behaviour means they can storm the German camp. The remaining German forces hear the noise coming from behind them (*clamore...audito*) and understand they are being attacked (*BG* 4,15,1). If in *BG* 3,26 Caesar uses this phrase to denote that the Romans do not raise the shout, but only hear it, here the situation is the reverse: the Romans are the ones who shout when they attack the Germans. In either event, this shout signals the beginning of a battle which will result in a Roman victory.

From the above incidents we can conclude that there are distinct visible and audible signs of an alarmed camp: first noise, whether shouting (*clamor*) or roaring of some kind (*fremitus*). Then, as a result, the soldiers start to run frantically, hither and thither (*concursum*). Interestingly, although in the *BG* Caesar clearly strives to distinguish Gauls or Germans from Romans,⁴¹ when they panic they all act alike.⁴²

At the end of the *BG* the famous battle of Alesia also provides us with astounding sounds. While the Romans are setting siege to Alesia, a Gallic force tries to rupture it. Under cover of night they silently advance until suddenly by clamour (*subito clamore sublato*) they let their arrival be known to those in the besieged town (*BG* 7,81,2). Another objective is to alert Vercingetorix. When he hears the shout (*clamore exaudito*) he also sounds a signal by trumpet (*tuba*) for his men to leave the town (*BG* 7,81,3). This time we see a strategic use of clamour, and also a signal by trumpet, akin to the Roman practice. Caesar here may be alluding to Vercingetorix being the only Gallic leader who approximated the Roman style of command.⁴³ It is only fitting that for the final clash between the armies a clamour is raised on either side (*utrimque clamore sublato*: *BG* 7,88,2). This time there are no sudden attacks and the impact is felt by both.

40 *Quorum timor cum fremitu et concursu significaretur...* (*BG* 4,14,3).

41 Gardner (1983); Barlow (1998); Rawlings (1998); Riggsby (2006) chapter four; Grillo (2012) 108–110.

42 I thank the editor of this journal, Annemarie Ambühl, for her comment that Caesar's description of an alarmed camp is very similar to the *topos* of *urbs capta*. A military camp can be considered as a kind of town itself, therefore it is only logical that the most natural reaction to invasion would be similar in a camp or a town.

43 On the characterization of Vercingetorix in the *BG* see Barlow (1998) 152–153; Jarvis (2001) chapter 4; Riggsby (2006) 97–100.

(d) Women's supplications: Avaricum and Gergovia

In addition to the distinctive clamours used in battle that we have discussed, in *BG VII*, when describing two consecutive sieges, of Avaricum and Gergovia, Caesar adds another sound to the established sounds of battle: women's supplications.

During the siege of Avaricum the Roman soldiers are detected and a shout is raised (*clamore sublato*) from the wall, but to no avail for the Gauls since Caesar is present at the scene and gives the necessary orders (*BG 7,24,3*). Understanding their difficult situation, the Gallic men plan secretly to leave the town and join Vercingetorix. Then their women and children approach, begging them to surrender. When they refuse the women shout (*conclamare*) and signal to the Romans, thus forcing the men to abandon their plan of escape (*BG 7,26*). The ensuing Roman conquest of the town wreaks terrible carnage, when even women and children are massacred in a show of Roman brutality. By chance, the shout which at first revealed the Roman soldiers, saved the lives of some 800 Gauls who managed to flee the town after hearing it (*primo clamore audito: BG 7,28,5*). Thus the same shout signified death and life for the people of Avaricum.

Clamours are loud and clearly heard, as we have seen. But what if the soldiers do not hear the appropriate sound at the right time? During the fatal siege of Gergovia, after taking several camps near the town Caesar orders a retreat. But all the other legions except the Tenth do not hear the sound of the trumpet (*non exaudito sono tubae: BG 7,47,2*) because they are farther off.⁴⁴ Here again Caesar prefers the passive voice: "the sound of the trumpet was not heard." Thus he avoids directly blaming the troops for not hearing the trumpet (hence disregarding his orders) and makes it seem as if the sound was lost somehow in the overall confusion of the fight. The elated soldiers continue their hasty advance but they are seen from the town. As a result a shout is raised (*orto clamore: BG 7,47,4*) from every part of the town, causing panic and tumult within. Complete chaos in the town follows, when mothers plead for the soldiers' mercy, beating their bare chests, throwing silver and garments from the wall: a most heart-rending scene, probably accompanied

⁴⁴ In contrast to the description in *BG II* of the battle at the Sabis, here the trumpet is used to signal retreat, not battle.

by sounds of weeping and wailing. The rumpus is so loud, that even the Gauls who have gathered in a different part of the town hear the shouting (*exaudito clamore*: *BG* 7,48,1) and hurry to the scene. Here *clamor* refers to the discovery of the soldiers as before, but also represents the overall tumult caused by the women's shouts. Upon the Gallic men's arrival these matrons, who only a moment before were pleading with the Roman soldiers, begin to entreat their men to save them, presenting their children. Thus we see the powerful effect of the women's loud supplication in both incidents. While in Avaricum their loud shouts foiled the men's plan of escape, in Gergovia they encourage the men to fight, since the horrors of Avaricum are fresh in their minds.

Adding women's voices to the scene accentuates the dramatic effect of the fight, and also illustrates the human tragedy of each battle. We do not know whether Caesar wished to present the Roman soldiers as bloodthirsty and murderers of women and children, but he exploited the siege of Avaricum as a strong deterrent for the rest of the Gauls.⁴⁵ Caesar possibly wished to appear as Rome's saviour thanks to his Gallic campaigns; by detailing the great numbers of the Gauls he killed, he harped on the ancient traumatic Roman memory of the feared Gauls from 390 B.C. and could prove to the Romans that he was now eliminating the ancient threat. Still, the scenes at Avaricum and Gergovia are unique in their intensity and dramatic affect.⁴⁶ Caesar used the destruction of towns to cause terror and discourage the Gauls from further attacks. Yet although the example of Avaricum was fresh in their minds, the Gauls still managed to repel the Romans in Gergovia, so this time the Caesarean deterrence was lacking. The

45 Powell (1998) surveys various examples of Caesar's ruthless behaviour especially during the Gallic campaign in contrast to his acts of mercy during the civil war. In the *BC* the most horrifying act of brutality perpetrated by Caesar is the destruction of the town of Gomphi in Thessaly, described in *BC* 3,80. With regard to the active supplication of women, such an event is echoed in *BC* II with the siege of Massilia. Only for this specific incident does Caesar refer to women's presence at a scene of battle in the *BC* (except Cleopatra, who commanded her own army). The difference is that Caesar, the *imperator* fighting a civil war in the *BC*, is more compassionate than Caesar, the chief commander of the Gallic campaign in the *BG*, and he spares the Massilians. For a detailed description see Grillo (2012) 92–95; Peer (2015) 97–99. On further elements of Caesar's narrative of Massilia see Kraus (2011).

46 During the slaughter of the Germanic tribes of the Tencteri and Usipetes in *BG* IV, women and children are described as escaping; yet there are no heart-rending scenes involving them as at Avaricum.

Gallic women proved a driving force for the men to fight. In fact, one could argue that it was the carnage of Avaricum that caused the Gallic success at Gergovia, since they had nothing to lose. They did not want to end up like Avaricum, so the people of Gergovia gave their all to the fighting; instead of simply causing terror, the carnage at Avaricum gave them renewed strength.

(e) Civil war clamours

In sharp contrast to the *BG*, the *BC* includes only four explicit references to *clamor*.⁴⁷

The first book of the *BC* narrates Caesar's swift seizure of Italy (and Rome) and then it focuses on the Spanish campaign and the battle of Ilerda (chapters 37–85). Caesar's troops are set against two Pompeian leaders, Afranius and Petreius, and they engage in several skirmishes until the final victory of Caesar's troops. During one of these clashes, when Caesar realizes that the Pompeians are trying to leave their camp, he signals his troops to advance in order to hinder the Pompeians' withdrawal. The enemy hears the army's clamour (*exaudito clamore*: *BC* 1,66,2) and fears that they may be caught up in battle during their march, so they abandon their plan to evacuate the camp. Here the clamour is used as a decoy: not to commence battle *de facto*, but to make the enemy think that a battle might ensue. Caesar thus manipulates the use of clamours to make the Pompeians change their strategy the way he wishes.

In the account of Pharsalus, Caesar contemplates the importance of *clamor* during a battle. In these ruminations Caesar severely criticizes Pompey's command. At the beginning of the battle Pompey ordered his men to stay put and not advance towards Caesar's men. Caesar claims that it is the commander's duty to encourage, not suppress, his men's natural excitement. He explains the rationale behind the old custom: "for it is not without reason that this institution exists from ancient times, that signs should be sounded from all sides, and that clamour (*clamoremque*) be raised by

47 Meusel (1877) 556–558: *BC* 1,66,2; 3,92,5; 3,105,4; 3,106,4. The reference in 3,105 is a part of the marvellous events reported after Pharsalus, the mysterious sound of an army's clamour and the signal for battle: *eodemque die Antiochiae in Syria bis tantus exercitus clamor et signorum sonus exauditus est*. Chapter 105 is devoted entirely to such miraculous phenomena which allegedly occurred in proximity to the battle of Pharsalus. The quotes from the *BC* are from Klotz's 1950 Teubner edition.

all; by these practices they thought that the enemy was frightened and their own men were incited.”⁴⁸ *Clamor* is an inevitable part of commencing a battle; Pompey has infringed this ancient practice (one that even the Gauls were aware of, as we have seen above). Pompey’s disregard of the ancient custom cost him the battle, the war, and eventually his life.

The last clamour in the *BC* is raised in Alexandria. Pompey, defeated by Caesar at Pharsalus, has tried to escape to that city. Caesar pursues him thither, and upon arrival he is at once greeted by soldiers assigned garrison duty by the young king Ptolomaeus. They recognize his authority (seeing the fasces in front of him). Theirs is a shout of recognition of Caesar’s new status (as consul), not a war cry.⁴⁹ Pompey, meanwhile, has been murdered by the king’s prefect Achillas.

To sum up, it is evident that unlike in the *BG*, *clamor* in the *BC* is scarcely used and only in *BC* I does it feature as a part of a military strategy. So how can this virtual lack of clamours in the *BC* be explained? True, Caesar engaged in more battles in Gaul, owing to the nature of his expedition there and the conglomeration of its local tribes. But can quantity be the only explanation? I believe that the reduction in the use of *clamor* is also connected to the unique nature of the *BC*. Caesar was writing a civil war narrative, not trying to glorify his triumphs over the multitude of barbarians in Gaul. He was more interested in elaborating his superior military strategy compared to Pompey’s and his legates’. The rules of battle engagement remained the same (as we may infer from his comment above); there was no point in mentioning them, since in the *BC* Romans were battling Romans. Caesar could not afford too many signs of eagerness among his troops to fight their fellow citizens. And as we have seen, clamours usually denote war cries or panic. Caesar did not wish his soldiers to appear as if unleashing a sudden onslaught on fellow Romans (he insists that he fights fairly). Nor does Caesar wish to make his soldiers look frightened by the Pompeians. Thus *clamor* and its definitions are not suitable for the kind of narrative Caesar composes in the *BC*.

48 *Hanc non reprimere, sed augere imperatores debent; neque frustra antiquitus institutum est, ut signa undique concinerent clamoremque universi tollerent* (*BC* 3,92,5). On Caesar’s reliance on *impetus* in his battles see Lendon (1999) 286–290.

49 *Ibi primum e navi egrediens clamorem militum audit...et concursum ad se fieri videt* (*BC* 3,106,4). This clamour of the soldiers in Egypt recalls the clamour of the Remi in *BG* 5,53,1 who congratulated Labienus on his victory.

(2) *militum voces*

In addition to *clamor* in the *BG* and the *BC*, I would like to focus on another word which Caesar uses in his battle descriptions: *vox*. Besides shouts, at times Caesar specifically refers to the soldiers' personal voices, *vores*, thus providing us an opportunity to eavesdrop on military talk during campaign.

(a) *Taunting voices*

We have noted the taunting voices of the Aduatuci from *BG* II, who laughed at the tower built by the Roman soldiers near the Gallic stronghold.⁵⁰ A reverse situation occurs in *BG* V. Quintus Cicero's camp was under the Nervii's siege, a practice they had learnt from the Romans.⁵¹ After their initial attack on the camp failed, one siege tower still remained, touching the rampart. This time it was the Romans who taunted the Nervii with words and gestures (*nutu vocibusque*: *BG* 5,43,6) daring them to climb it; but the Nervii were too frightened to do so. This incident highlights the difference between the Romans and the Gauls. In *BG* II the Aduatuci were unfamiliar with the Roman siege works, which they lampooned—only later to realize their might. In *BG* V the Nervii tried to imitate the Roman technique, but they lacked the necessary courage; in the end it was the Romans who mocked the Gauls for their pale imitation.

A similar situation arises during the Spanish campaign in *BC* I. Caesar decides to lead his troops across difficult terrain and by a longer route to the river Ebro, thus closing the path for the Pompeians. The Pompeian soldiers think that Caesar's army is fleeing and they taunt the men as cowards (*contumeliosisque vocibus*: *BC* 1,69,1). When the Pompeians at last grasp Caesar's plan it is too late for them. Despite the call to arms (*conclamatur ad*

50 *BG* 2,29–33. See above II.1.b.

51 Riggsby (2006) 77–78 notes that the Nervii showed that “Roman technology no longer clearly trumps Gallic”. Yet Caesar emphasizes that the Nervii acquired this technique from the Romans over the years, and that they had prisoners from the army who secretly aided them. One could argue that the reason why he mentions that these prisoners were held in secret was that there was no evidence for their existence. However, it is important for Caesar to stress that this was not a technological leap accomplished by the Gauls themselves, but the result of Roman training. Riggsby briefly refers to this ‘borrowing’ in his conclusion on p. 101.

arma: BC 1,69,4)⁵² they cannot overtake Caesar's men in time. Again, the enemy is too short-sighted and arrogant to fully perceive Caesar's plan.

The above incidents show that taunting is a part of psychological warfare. Caesar deliberately emphasizes such occurrences in order to show how the enemy (Gallic or Roman) underestimated his troops, and in the end the Caesareans had the last laugh. Furthermore, taunts are usually signs of arrogance; and arrogance, as anyone who has read a Greek tragedy knows, sooner or later causes downfall. The readers of the commentaries enjoy prior knowledge of Caesar's strategy owing to his generous explanations of the relevant incidents. His enemies in the narrative (Gallic tribes or Pompeians) do not share that knowledge; they are ignorant of Caesar's true intentions. By highlighting their taunts Caesar deliberately creates irony; a joke understood only by himself and his readers at the expense of his oblivious rivals in the story. Readers of the commentaries are thus conscripted to Caesar's team willy-nilly. They share his secret, his strategy. They know what the Gauls or the Pompeians do not. Thus they can better appreciate Caesar's mastery of strategy over his rivals. In the case of the taunting Gauls, Roman readers may gloat as the Gauls' stupidity is revealed and their attempts to copy Roman techniques are exposed as jejune and futile.

(b) Eager voices

Not all voices are directly connected to an exchange with the enemy. Some refer to the soldiers' state of mind and afford us a glimpse into the camp-life mentality of the legions (according to their general, the author).⁵³ One such example is Caesar's emphasis on the legions' eagerness to fight, even against their commander's better judgement. We have three notable examples from the *BG*:⁵⁴

52 Caesar prefers the verb *conclamare* to the noun *clamor*.

53 On military psychology in Caesar and his Greek predecessors see Lendon (1999) 290–304.

54 Regarding the soldiers' eagerness to fight, there are explicit incidents in the commentaries in which individual voices are heard and distinguished. We have already seen in *BG* II during the battle of the Sabis that Caesar had to encourage the troops, and an exhortation was indeed routine before a battle. But at times fellow soldiers take the initiative to spur their comrades on. In the *BG*'s description of the invasion of Britain, when the soldiers were approaching Britain's shores the legions were hesitant to

During Crassus' campaign in Aquitania, described in *BG* III, he decided to approach the enemy carefully and not to engage in battle too quickly. Crassus' soldiers, however, eagerly anticipated battle, and did not understand why their commander was lingering. The soldiers voiced their displeasure unanimously (*omnium voces audirentur*: *BG* 3,24,5). Crassus later did commence battle and triumphed.

On a similar occasion Sabinus (prior to his defeat) also decided to remain in his camp and not to be drawn into battle despite the enemy's provocations and taunts. His soldiers, however, were less understanding and started questioning his decision.⁵⁵

The last example involves Q. Cicero. When Cicero was held up in his camp, awaiting Caesar, he forbade anyone to leave the camp; his command encountered harsh criticism by the army. As Caesar describes it, Cicero "was moved by voices which called his endurance almost a blockade".⁵⁶

A similar situation occurs in the *BC* as well. While fighting Afranius and Petreius in Spain, Caesar decided to wait and not resume the fighting. His soldiers opposed his decision openly.⁵⁷ Yet Caesar was adamant not to risk lives on either sides (in a rare reference to the fact that this was a civil war).⁵⁸ Caesar's legates in Gaul chose to avoid battle since they were waiting for Caesar's orders (Cicero) or simply looking for the best opportunity (Crassus and Sabinus). Caesar, however, rationalized his decision not just through military motives but mainly through his wish to keep the soldiers (his and his rival's troops alike) as much out of harm's way as he could. Again, the nature of the war impacted such decisions as well. Nor should we forget that

land. Then the eagle-bearer of the Tenth legion encouraged his comrades with a strong voice (*voce magna*: *BG* 4,25,4). The same phrase, *magna voce*, is used in *BC* II to denote the heroic act of a simple soldier, Fabius, who served under Caesar's legate Curio in the African campaign. This Fabius called out loud the name of the Pompeian commander, Varus, and tried to kill him (*BC* 2,35,1–2). He was then killed by Varus' men. Once more Caesar narrates heroic conduct by an individual soldier which began with a loud call. But while in the *BG* the eagle-bearer produced a loud voice to urge his comrades to follow him, in the *BC* Fabius acts alone. He shouts for the enemy to hear him, not his peers.

55 ...*non solum hostibus in contemptionem Sabinus veniret, sed etiam nostrorum militum vocibus non nihil carperetur* (*BG* 3,17,5).

56 ...*simul eorum permotus vocibus qui illius patientiam paene obsessionem appellabant...* (*BG* 6,36,2).

57 ...*palam inter se loquebantur...* (*BC* 1,72,4).

58 *Monebatur etiam misericordia civium, quos interficiendos videbat* (*BC* 1,72,3). On the use of *cives* in this sentence see Peer (2015) 69.

Caesar himself was documenting his actions. He also had to accommodate his motives to the kind of commentaries he was writing.

In addition, during the Spanish campaign, in a prior incident, the soldiers had asked their officers to notify Caesar that they were willing to cross a roaring river, even though Caesar was hesitant, fearing for their safety. In the end he gave in to their enthusiasm (*quorum studio et vocibus excitatus*: *BC* 1,64,3) and crossed the river. But he would not risk an open fight only to appease their desire to vanquish the enemy.

We can thus surmise that Caesar's legions were eager to fight, in Gaul or in other campaigns. They were skilled warriors, who trusted in their capabilities. Hence it was up to their commander to prove his merit by not yielding to their feelings, but choosing the best alternative for the given situation, even if his popularity with the men might be at risk. Caesar's legates in Gaul mostly proved themselves worthy of his trust and did not let the soldiers' excessive zeal dictate their strategy.

Another strong indicator of the fervour and determination of Caesar's soldiers is narrated in *BC* III, during the campaign in Greece. While Caesar was hunting Pompey, his army endured a shortage of provisions. Yet Caesar's soldiers are reported as frequently proclaiming (*crebraeque voces*: *BC* 3,49,1) that they would sooner feed off the bark of trees than give up on the Pompeians. Talk of this kind exemplifies the resolution and toughness of Caesar's army (a frequent motif in the *BC*). Such staunch behaviour accords with the soldiers' eagerness to fight their foes. And they are not shy in voicing their opinions on the matter.

As these examples show, Caesar is fond of portraying his soldiers (in both the *BG* and the *BC*) as possessing unparalleled *virtus*. Regarding the Pompeians, we should differentiate between the soldiers and their commanders. The soldiers are following orders, so they do not assume responsibility for their actions (fighting a civil war); all blame lies with their commanders. The Pompeian leaders are described in many instances in the *BC* as arrogant, cowardly, and even cruel.⁵⁹ Caesar would like to show his audience that the Pompeian leaders did not enjoy the complete cooperation of their soldiers. Just as he signifies his soldiers' opinion through the word *vox*, Caesar uses this word to offer us a glimpse into the Pompeian soldiers'

59 Caesar's presentation of the Pompeians is a complicated subject which gives rise to various, even contrasting, views. I shall not go into the specifics here. For a more detailed account of this subject see Grillo (2012) *passim*; Peer (2015) *passim*.

state of mind as well. In the above examples the Caesarean soldiers are eager to fight; in the *BC* Caesar describes a reverse incident when the Pompeian soldiers refuse to fight against a Roman consul (Caesar). As mentioned, the Pompeian soldiers are not described as cowards in the *BC*. When Caesar swiftly seized Italy at the beginning of *BC* I (chapters 11–29) he mentions that the Pompeians were fleeing before him;⁶⁰ yet he concentrates on the commanders and not the private soldiers. These do not declare that they are unwilling to fight Caesar. However, when the Pompeian legate Scipio moves his legions out of Syria in an attempt to lead them against Caesar, they vocally refuse. This time the soldiers' voices (*militum voces*) are heard, declaring (as Caesar reports): "if they are being led against an enemy they will go, however, against a citizen and consul they will not carry arms."⁶¹ Of course Caesar wishes to show how the Pompeian leaders try to fight a Roman consul as part of his planned denigration of his rivals. Yet the phrase *militum voces* contributes to our previous discussion on the way Caesar uses *vores* deliberately to describe the state of mind within the army—his or Pompey's.⁶²

(3) Two cases studies from *BG* and *BC*

(a) Disharmony: The ruin of Sabinus and Cotta in *BG* V

Having examined various sounds which form the nexus of battles, and having reviewed the talk of the soldiers, I now treat in detail the special use of sounds which contribute to the narration of the fatal battle of Sabinus and Cotta in *BG* V.⁶³ This episode contains many references to specific

60 For example the praetor Thermus from Iguvium (*BC* 1,12) or Attius Varus from Auximum (*BC* 1,13,2).

61 *...ac nonnullae militum voces cum audirentur sese, contra hostem si ducerentur, ituros, contra civem et consulem arma non laturos...* (*BC* 3,31,4).

62 Caesar chose to include the soldiers' feelings here to highlight the point that he is the elected consul. Before the battles of Dyrrachium or Pharsalus, Pompey's troops did not voice any objections. So we have here a nice example of how tendentious Caesar's narrative is. Another reference to the Pompeian troops' voices is mentioned at the end of *BC* I. After Caesar's victory over them in Spain (at Ilerda), the vanquished soldiers unanimously express their wish to be discharged (*et voce et manibus universi: BC* 1,86,2) and not be enrolled in Caesar's army.

63 I shall not discuss all the aspects of this incident here, just the use of sound motifs. For an analysis of this episode, especially the portrayal of Sabinus, see Rasmussen (1963)

manners of speech and the sounds of battle we have already discussed (like *clamor*). Hence it may serve for another, longer, case study to conclude this part of the paper concerning various words denoting sound in the commentaries.

Quintus Titurius Sabinus and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta were given the command as legates of a new legion and five cohorts, and were stationed in the country of the Eburones for winter quarters. Caesar especially notes that they were entrusted with a recently enrolled legion, not one of the veterans. This would explain the later calamity. After sustaining a Gallic attack led by Ambiorix, they were asked to conduct negotiations with him. As Caesar puts it, “then, according to their custom, they shouted loudly (*conclamaverunt*), that one of ours come forward for talks”.⁶⁴ This note can also be seen as a jibe by Caesar at the Gallic custom of shouting on various occasions.

Ambiorix warns the Roman generals that a combined attack of Gallic and German forces is approaching and that they should leave their winter quarters and go to Labienus’ or Cicero’s camp. He promises to guarantee their safe passage. The alarmed generals quickly summon a war council. While Cotta advises waiting and referring the matter to Caesar, Sabinus is less composed. He does not simply speak his mind: he shouts—repeatedly. Caesar uses the frequentative verb *clamitabat* (*BG* 5,29,1). By using this verb he does not simply convey that Sabinus spoke louder than the others: this verb reveals Sabinus’ state of mind at the time; he was undoubtedly stressed and panic-stricken. The repetition symbolized by this verb indicates his utter fear. Sabinus’ conduct thus greatly contrasts with the composure of Cotta and the centurions who spoke previously. To describe their arguments, Caesar uses the verb *existimabant*, ‘they thought’, ‘formed a judgement’ (*BG* 5,28,3). Sabinus lacks sound judgement; all he does is scream deafeningly that they should leave the winter quarters at once. Interestingly, this verb appears only twice in the commentaries, both times in *BG* V.⁶⁵ But in the first appearance it is Dumnorix of the Aedui who is described as shouting again and again, while pleading for his life (*saepe clamitans*: *BG* 5,7,8). This similarity does not necessarily mean that Caesar likens Sabinus to Dumnorix, but it does indicate that he deems Sabinus’ conduct highly inappropriate for

24–27; Welch (1998) 93–96; Powell (1998) 117–121; Brown (2004) 295–301; Riggsby (2006) 93–95.

64 *Tum suo more conclamaverunt, uti aliqui ex nostris ad colloquium prodiret* (*BG* 5,26,4).

65 Meusel (1887) 556.

a Roman commander. As Robert Brown concludes: “To sum up: Sabinus’ verbal ‘victory’ in debate leads to a military defeat that is stained by his poor judgment and cowardice.”⁶⁶ In addition, Sabinus made a grave mistake in disregarding Caesar. While Cotta suggested referring the matter to Caesar’s judgement, Sabinus was certain that Caesar had left for Italy. Caesar himself writes in chapter 24 that he decided to wait in Gaul for the time being. Thus the canny reader already knows that Sabinus is wrong about Caesar, therefore his entire proposition is doomed from the start.

Cotta severely opposes Sabinus, so the latter again uses his voice as his weapon: “and he, in louder voice, so that a great part of the soldiers will hear (said)....”⁶⁷ As if his initial shouts were not enough, Sabinus now screams so that all will hear him. He uses shouting as a tool to agitate the soldiers, to cause terror and incite them against Cotta. After a long encounter, Cotta is forced to concede. But yet again their plan is thwarted by the noise they make—a peculiar kind of noise which in the commentaries Caesar associates with panic: *fremitus*. Caesar notes that the enemy has realized that the Romans plan to leave the camp by their night-time roaring and watching (*ex nocturno fremitu vigiliisque*. BG 5,32,1). The enemy handily ambushes the departing troops. Cotta’s and Sabinus’ conduct during the fight matches their behaviour at the council earlier. While Sabinus is completely overwhelmed by the sudden attack, and in fact wholly loses his senses, Cotta again proves to be the calm and collected general who tries to form a plan. But it is too late. While the generals order the soldiers to abandon the baggage, the men still rush to grab some necessities. Caesar sums up the tragic situation in a sentence: “everything was filled with clamour and crying” (*clamore et fletu*).⁶⁸

The tragic end of the commanders and their legions soon follows, when Sabinus again trusts Ambiorix and as a result once more falls into his trap. While Sabinus and Ambiorix are negotiating, the Gauls surround the (unarmed) Roman troops and slaughter them. Caesar comments on the Gauls’ behaviour after they kill Sabinus while negotiations are afoot: “then indeed according to their custom they shout (*conclamant*) victory and also

66 Brown (2004) 300.

67 ...*et id clariore voce, ut magna pars militum exaudiret* (BG 5,30,1).

68 ...*quae quisque eorum carissima haberet ab impedimentis petere atque arripere properaret, clamore et fletu omnia complerentur* (BG 5,33,6).

raise a howl (*ululatum*),⁶⁹ they throw our orders into confusion, after an attack was made on our men.”⁷⁰ Caesar here underlines the Gauls’ screams and howls; their shouts accentuate their savageness, their joy at the slaughter of the Romans who came unarmed to negotiate surrender. These are not usual war cries; Caesar would like us to understand these howls as the savage practice of the barbarians, their usual habit (*suo more*).

(b) The tempestuous senate-meeting in BC 1,1–3

In analogy to the noisy war council of *BG* V, a scene of tumult is presented in the *BC*. But here Caesar describes a senate session, which soon becomes a council of war—civil war.⁷¹ In the four opening chapters of the *BC*, Caesar describes how the senate meeting was in fact meant to take action against him. The consul Lentulus does not allow Caesar’s letters to be read in the assembly (*BC* 1,1,1–2) and then Lentulus and his supporters use harsh tones (and voices) to sway and threaten the more feeble senators.⁷² As Caesar concludes: “thus by the voices of the consul, the terror of the present army and the threats of Pompey’s friends, they are compelled and forced against their will to follow Scipio’s opinion”.⁷³

Comparing the senate dealings early in 49 B.C. as narrated in the first four chapters of the *BC* with a military camp under attack in the *BG*, we find an astonishing resemblance. We have already seen that what characterizes an alarmed camp are shouts and aimless running in all directions. In *BC* 1,3 Caesar describes an exceptional evening gathering of the senate, which was

69 The word *ululatus* appears only twice in the commentaries: Meusel (1887) 2349. This is the first time; the second is in *BG* VII during the battle of Alesia, when the Gauls tried to encourage their comrades by shouts and howling (*clamore et ululatu*: *BG* 7,80,4).

70 *Tum vero suo more victoriam conclamant atque ululatum tollunt impetuque in nostros facto ordines perturbant* (*BG* 5,37,3).

71 On the tempestuous senate-meeting at the beginning of the *BC* see Peer (2015) 13–15, 21–22.

72 For a detailed account of this meeting see Batstone/Damon (2006) 43–49; Peer (2015) 13–14.

73 *Sic vocibus consulis, terrore praesentis exercitus, minis amicorum Pompei plerique compulsi inviti coacti Scipionis sententiam sequuntur* (*BC* 1,2,6). Scipio, Pompey’s father-in-law (he wed his daughter Cornelia to Pompey after the death of Caesar’s daughter Julia) suggested to the senate that Caesar should disband his troops, otherwise he would be considered an enemy of the *res publica*.

called by Pompey. Besides the senators, Pompey's legions and supporters are present at the scene. Thus, Caesar notes, "by their voices and running around the weak (senators) were frightened, the doubtful strengthened".⁷⁴ What Caesar describes in *BC I*, in the heart of Rome, is a camp invaded by an enemy. His language will be easily recognizable by those who have read the *BG*. His intention is clear: Pompey is a threat to Rome.

(4) Game of rumours

In addition to the obvious sounds of shouts and howls, the sense of hearing is also presented through the machination of rumours. Years later, Virgil wrote about the danger posed by the winged *Fama*:

Fama (Rumour), no other evil is swifter than she.⁷⁵

While Caesar is not concerned about mere gossip, rumours pose a dangerous threat in a military campaign.⁷⁶ In the commentaries, Caesar cynically describes the effects of false rumours, especially those telling of his alleged downfall. Rumours are a significant part of psychological warfare, whether in foreign or civil wars. Rumours applied correctly can contribute to the strategic planning of a battle (e.g., as in the case of Sabinus). In his overview of Gallic mannerisms, Caesar notes that the Gauls are prone to rumours, that they force travellers to share tales with them. As Caesar notes: "being moved by these things and hearsay they often form plans regarding important matters...they are slaves to uncertain rumours and many respond by (telling) fictions matching their will".⁷⁷ The Gauls, as Caesar notes, depend on rumours to plan their strategy, not on facts or calculated plans.⁷⁸

74 *Quorum vocibus et concursu terrentur infirmiores, dubii confirmantur* (*BC* 1,3,5). Cf. the alarmed Caesarean camp in *BG* 2,24,3 or the German camp in *BG* 4,14,3 (see above II.1.b–c).

75 *Fama, malum qua non aliud uelocius ullum* (Verg. *Aen.* 4,174).

76 As Hardie (2012) 228 notes: "the Roman historians are fully alert...to the crucial role played by *fama*, opinion and talk, in the *res gestae* that are their subject matter." Caesar repeatedly uses the word *rumor*, yet he also uses the word *fama* at times, mainly because *fama* carries different interpretations, as Hardie continues (237): "*fama* is both the glory of the individual hero of legend or history...and also the unattributable and creeping rumours that spread like wildfire among the common people."

77 *His rebus atque auditionibus permoti de summis saepe rebus consilia ineunt...cum incertis rumoribus seruiant et plerique ad voluntatem eorum ficta respondeant* (*BG* 4,5,3).

78 Brown (2014) 398.

The aforementioned Roman general Sabinus (before his fatal defeat) used to his advantage this penchant of the Gauls to believe in rumours. He feigned being afraid to fight Viridovix of the Venelli and even sent to the enemy one of his Gallic soldiers, who pretended to be a deserter. He told the enemy that the Romans were in a difficult situation and that the Gauls should attack at once. Caesar notes that one of the reasons that convinced them was that “what generally happens [is] that people readily believe the thing which they wish for”.⁷⁹ Thus Sabinus supplied the Gauls with the fiction they were eager to hear, and eventually manipulated this trait of theirs to win the battle.

Another example of this Gallic habit is found in the harsh battle of the Sabis narrated in *BG* II. When the Roman camp was attacked, the Treveri (a Gallic tribe), who were recruited as auxiliaries to the Roman army, thought the Romans had lost and hurried home, deserting them. They reported to their states that the Romans were beaten.⁸⁰ These of course were false rumours caused by fear and the Treveri failed to assess Roman resourcefulness correctly. In the opening of *BG* VII we see again how quickly the Gauls inflate rumours. They hear about the commotion in Rome after Clodius’ murder,⁸¹ and as Caesar remarks, “the Gauls themselves add and invent in addition to the rumours...that Caesar...cannot return to his army”.⁸² Such rumours quickly spread and as a result the Gauls, led by Vercingetorix, decided openly to revolt.

Yet the Romans are not immune to rumours either. The first major rumour the Romans hear is related in *BG* I, concerning the Germans’ nature a propos Ariovistus’ open provocation of Caesar. The soldiers are alarmed by the stories of German stature and prowess. As a result, dread and anxiety infiltrate Caesar’s camp.⁸³ Caesar openly blames those who have talked with such fear (*horum vocibus ac timore*: *BG* 1,39,5); two factors have aggravated the situation: the voices (whether talking or sounds) and fear. Just as voices can be used to encourage the men, they can serve to dishearten them. Caesar

79 ...et quod fere libenter homines id quod volunt credunt (*BG* 3,18,6).

80 ...legiones premi et paene circumventas teneri, calones, equites, funditores Numidas ... fugere ... desperatis nostris rebus domum contenderunt; Romanos pulsos superatosque, castris impedimentisque eorum hostis potitos civitati renuntiaverunt (*BG* 2,24,4–5). For the context see above II.1.b.

81 The tribune Clodius Pulcher was murdered by Annius Milo in Rome in 52 B.C.

82 Addunt ipsi et adfingunt rumoribus Galli quod res poscere videbatur, retineri urbano motu Caesarem neque in tantis dissensionibus ad exercitum venire posse (*BG* 7,1,2).

83 James (2000); Kraus (2010) 256.

chooses to face this problem head on, with a fierce speech in which he belittles the Germans' success and glorifies himself and his capabilities as a commander. We have already seen how in *BG* II Caesar tries to overcome the panic in the camp by calling the centurions by name. This is the very practice he employs here: reassuring timorous voices with confident words.

In *BG* VI Quintus Cicero's camp faces a German attack while they await the arrival of Caesar and his troops. The Germans' sudden appearance throws the camp into confusion (*tumultus*) and the alarmed soldiers are quick to spread rumours about an enemy advance: "the whole camp is agitated, and one asks another regarding the cause of the tumult...one declares that the camp has already been captured, the other insists that the barbarians have arrived victorious after annihilating the army and the commander."⁸⁴ Their confusion contributes to the Germans' belief that they have won.⁸⁵ The shouting is heard (*clamorem exaudiunt*) by a party of Cicero's soldiers who had ventured outside the camp, and their cavalry quickly hurries back (*BG* 6,39,1). Their arrival at first confuses the Germans into thinking that the legions have returned, but they soon realize it is just a small number and consequently they continue the attack with greater vigour. The soldiers' terror is so great that even after the Germans withdraw they still believe that all the Roman forces have been destroyed: "as a result (of the massive German attack) fear preoccupied their hearts entirely so that they were almost out of their minds, saying that after all the forces had been destroyed, the cavalry had escaped..."⁸⁶ Only Caesar's arrival eases their fears. As we have seen, Caesar's entry on the scene works wonders for the soldiers: in *BG* II during the attack on his camp, and also here during the attack on Cicero's camp, or in Alesia where Caesar's purple cloak is visible from afar (*BG* 7,88,1)—everywhere his confident persona has the power to calm the soldiers. His presence is the answer to all false rumours.

Rumours also play an important part in a civil war. Caesar emphasizes especially the Pompeians' haste to believe false rumours regarding his defeat in various battles. Since his readers already know the outcome of the war, his emphasis on false rumours is meant to show the Pompeians' unreliability

84 *Totis trepidatur castris, atque alius ex alio causam tumultus quaerit...alius castra iam capta pronuntiat, alius delecto exercitu atque imperatore victores barbaros venisse contendit* (*BG* 6,37,6–7).

85 *Tali timore omnibus perterritis, confirmatur opinio barbaris, ut ex captivo audierant, nullum esse intus praesidium* (*BG* 6,37,9).

86 *Sic omnino animos timor praecipaverat ut paene alienata mente deletis omnibus copiis equitatum se ex fuga recepisse dicerent* (*BG* 6,41,3).

and lack of devotion. For example, as we have seen, many senators rushed to Pompey's side only after assuming Caesar had lost, and not because they truly supported him.

During the Spanish campaign, the arrival of Caesar's supplies is hindered by severe floods at Ilerda. Realizing Caesar's precarious position, the Pompeian commanders at the scene, Afranius and Petreius, are quick to inform their friends at Rome of their alleged victory. Rumours begin to spread, as if the war were nearly over.⁸⁷ As Caesar's situation improves, the Pompeians begin to fear him again. Not only has the rumour spread by the Pompeians about Caesar proved false, another rumour regarding their own army is also confounded. The Pompeians in Spain believe that reinforcements will arrive with Pompey. This is soon disproved (*extinctis rumoribus de auxiliis*: BC 1,60,5). These false rumours turn out to be a double-edged sword for the Pompeians. Not only are their predictions about Caesar premature and wrong, they do not even grasp the real situation in their own camp. More importantly, they do not assess Pompey's true character. Caesar builds Pompey's image as an *imperator* who forsakes his men in their time of need. He did not go to save Domitius at Corfinium when the latter was besieged by Caesar,⁸⁸ and he is not marching to save the Spanish legions. He is false—just like the rumours. Caesar on the other hand is reliable; as we have seen from the Gallic campaign, he always comes through for his troops. Rumours of Caesar's downfall are always false in the commentaries as he always triumphs in the end. Caesar is a true leader, Pompey is false. This is the clear-cut dichotomy of the *BC*.

As in Gaul, the Caesarean forces are not immune to rumours; but also as in Gaul, such false rumours do not occur in the camps Caesar personally commands. Curio the tribune has crossed to Caesar's side and has become one of his legates; he is then sent to Africa to fight the Pompeian forces there under the command of the Pompeian legate Attius Varus. Curio's army is composed of Caesarean and also former Pompeian legions (e.g., some of the Pompeian legions that lost at Corfinium under Domitius joined

87 *Haec Afranius Petreiusque et eorum amici pleniora etiam atque uberiora Romam ad suos perscribebant. Multa rumores adfingebant, ut paene bellum confectum videretur* (BC 1,53,1). See Peer (2015) 26.

88 *Litteris perlectis Domitius dissimulans in consilio pronuntiat Pompeium celeriter subsidio venturum* (BC 1,19,1). At Corfinium, Domitius openly and deliberately lies to his men since he knows Pompey is not coming. He pretends that help is on the way to buy himself time to escape on his own (1,20,1).

the Caesarean army). One of the Pompeian officers from Corfinium, Quintilius Varus, arrives in Africa and tries to sway the newly recruited Pompeian legions of Curio's army to defect and leave their new commander. His instigations cause great alarm in the camp.⁸⁹ Following these appeals, Caesar minutely describes how panic seized Curio on hearing the soldiers' conversations (*variis hominum sermonibus: BC 2,29,1*): "for each of them invented opinions, and to what he had heard from someone else, each added something of his own fear."⁹⁰ After these imagined stories had circulated among the soldiers, in the end, believing their own stories to be the truth, they even vouched for them. Some of the men, caught up in the overall alarm, went so far as to fabricate stories entirely.⁹¹

Curio manages to reassure the men a little and leads them to fight the Pompeians. After a successful battle, Curio himself makes the mistake of believing false rumours (or deliberate lies) and acting on them: as Caesar comments, Curio hastily, even recklessly (*temere credens: BC 2,38,2*),⁹² trust false reports regarding the movements of the Numidian king, Juba, who fought in Africa beside the Pompeians. Curio naïvely (or rather vainly) believed that King Juba would not fight him, yet he was fatally wrong.⁹³ As the Numidians eventually surprised Curio's men, carnage soon followed and the entire army was filled with terror and mourning (*plena erant omnia timoris et luctus: BC 2,41,8*). Their fear was so great that Curio's encouraging words did not affect them at all. Unlike similar incidents from the *BG*, which we discussed above, Curio lacked Caesar's charisma and confidence. He could not appease his soldiers as Caesar could.

89 ...*Quintilius circumire aciem Curionis atque obsecrare milites coepit, ne primi sacramenti, quod apud Domitium atque apud se quaestorem dixissent, memoriam deponerent...* (BC 2,28,2).

90 *Unusquisque enim opinions fingebat, et ad id, quod ab alio audierat, sui aliquid timoris addebat* (BC 2,29,1).

91 *Nonnulla etiam ab his, qui diligentiores videri volebant, fangebantur* (BC 2,29,4). Caesar here uses the same verb as above, *fingere*. However, in the first passage the soldiers did not fabricate the entire story but added their own sentiments to what they had heard from others. Meusel (1877) 1301 refers to the first sentence (2,29,1) as '*animo concipere, cogitatione effingere*' that is, forming an opinion (based on something). As to the last passage (2,29,4), he notes '*comminisci, ementiri*' in the sense of 'invent, feign'.

92 Curio's conduct here recalls the Gallic habit of drawing up plans according to stories and rumours.

93 Curio heard the reports that Juba sent messages to the Pompeian forces under Varus to reassure them that he was on his way. Yet Curio did not believe the true reports: *nuntiabantur haec eadem Curioni, sed aliquamdiu fides fieri non poterat* (BC 2,37,1).

We have already shown from the above examples how clever use of rumours can rebound to one's benefit. In *BC III*, in the campaign at Dyrrachium Caesar employs a reverse tactic to the one used in Gaul. We have seen from the examples above that when the Gauls tried to provoke Crassus and Sabinus to fight they faked cowardice and did not leave their camp, thus making the enemy think they were timid; they eventually commenced battle when it suited them.

At Dyrrachium Caesar acts almost the same as the Gauls in provoking Pompey to openly fight him. His plan is to make it seem as if Pompey is timidly doing nothing while Caesar encircles his camp, thus harming Pompey's repute as a commander. Caesar consciously wishes that rumours will spread across the region (*fama per orbem terrarum: BC 3,43,3*), emphasizing his own actions and Pompey's idleness. Caesar shows in the commentaries that the good judgement exhibited by his legates in Gaul was mistakenly perceived as cowardice, but in the end their caution paid off. Nevertheless, in the Greek campaign near Dyrrachium he hopes that Pompey will lose his calm and instead of maintaining a restrained strategy will fall into his trap because of his conceit and fear for his good name.⁹⁴

To conclude, rumours are the Achilles' heel of any campaign, especially if they are spread too soon. Caesar in his commentaries strives to show that his enemies celebrated his downfall prematurely, and they were repeatedly wrong. A true commander pays no heed to rumours, but follows verified reports and his own instincts; and when necessary he can exploit rumours to his own advantage. In the great ensemble of sounds, shouts, and voices on the battlefield, rumours are heard clearly. Rumours are built on the sounds we have discussed in the foregoing. They give their own interpretations to clamours (e.g., turn win into loss), and they circulate through the soldiers' voices. But a good commander knows how to differentiate true from false and how to calm his troops.

III. Conclusion

In this paper I have indicated how Caesar deploys specific words to denote individual sounds during a military campaign in order to achieve a literary

94 In the end Caesar was forced to retreat, and he suffered a devastating loss at Dyrrachium which almost cost him the war.

climax. Sounds are an inevitable part of the campaigns, and they have the power to alter the course of the fight. Caesar, *suo more*, chooses which words to emphasize, especially regarding the use of *clamor*. *Clamor* denotes the complete mayhem which engulfs a battlefield, yet it also conveys the triumphant shouts of the soldiers or the orders of attack. Thus we can see that there are contradicting sounds which are depicted by using the same word. One of the reasons is Caesar's preference of a limited vocabulary. But another reason might be that during a battle sounds are very confusing; the soldiers need to figure out if they are under attack or if help is coming. The use of *clamor* illustrates this commotion. The shouts of the soldiers and the overall disarrayed atmosphere of the battlefield allow Caesar to highlight his own commending skills, especially in comparison with those of his opponents. A general who can control his troops in the midst of such disorder will win the day. The difference between a foreign and a civil war is also revealed by the use of *clamor*. As noted above, there are far more incidents in which *clamor* is used in the *BG* as opposed to scarcely any in the *BC*. Fighting a civil war is a painful matter and writing about it should be done with caution. Caesar tries to obscure the civil nature of the war with Pompey. Therefore he does not emphasize eager shouts signalling attacks or fear but tries to minimize the sound of the battlefield altogether. In addition to sounds, Caesar also reveals how uncontrolled rumours can destroy battle plans and fill the soldiers with fear and anxiety. The Pompeians are especially presented as relying on false rumours, without realizing the reality of their situation. Again, in comparison, Caesar's true genius as a leader allows him to trust his own judgment and not rely on the words of others. This is what set him apart from his legate Curio, who desperately tried to prove he was worthy of his command, but was too arrogant and did not judge the situation correctly. Humans naturally fear what they cannot see, so Caesar explains. They fear unfamiliar sounds, wild rumours, the enemy's howls. Yet the only fixed element in this military disharmony is Caesar. Only he can ease the soldiers' fears by muffling the unfamiliar sounds with his reassuring commands.

Bibliography

- Barlow (1998). – Jonathan Barlow, Noble Gauls and Their Other in Caesar's Propaganda, in: Welch/Powell (1998) 139–170.
- Batstone/Damon (2006). – William W. Batstone/Cynthia Damon, *Caesar's Civil War* (Oxford 2006).
- Brown (1999). – Robert D. Brown, Two Caesarian Battle-Descriptions: A Study in Contrast, *CJ* 94 (1999) 329–357.
- (2004). – Robert D. Brown, 'Virtus consili expers': An Interpretation of the Centurions' Contest in Caesar, *De bello Gallico* 5,44, *Hermes* 132 (2004) 292–308.
- (2014). – Robert D. Brown, A Civilized Gaul: Caesar's Portrait of Piso Aquitanus (*De Bello Gallico* 4,12,4–6), *Mnemosyne* 67 (2014) 391–404.
- Dixon/Dixon (1992). – Mollie Dixon/John Dixon, The Significance of Emphasis in Latin—A Case Study from Caesar's *Bellum Gallicum*, *G&R* 39 (1992) 66–77.
- Drexler (1959). – Hans Drexler, *Bellum Iustum*, *RhM* 102 (1959) 97–140.
- Erbig (1931). – Eduard Erbig, *Topoi in den Schlachtenberichten römischer Dichter* (Diss. Würzburg 1931).
- Fantham (2009). – Elaine Fantham, Caesar as an Intellectual, in: Griffin (2009) 141–156.
- Garcea (2012). – Alessandro Garcea, *Caesar's De Analogia* (Oxford 2012).
- Gardner (1983). – Jane F. Gardner, The 'Gallic Menace' in Caesar's Propaganda, *G&R* 30 (1983) 181–189.
- Griffin (2009). – Miriam Griffin (ed.), *A Companion to Julius Caesar* (Chichester [U.K.]/Malden [MA] 2009).
- Grillo (2011). – Luca Grillo, Scribam ipse de me: The Personality of the Narrator in Caesar's *Bellum Civile*, *AJPb* 132 (2011) 243–271.
- (2012). – Luca Grillo, *The Art of Caesar's Bellum Civile* (Cambridge 2012).
- Hall (1998). – Lindsay G.H. Hall, *Ratio and Romanitas in the Bellum Gallicum*, in: Welch/Powell (1998) 11–43.
- Hardie (2012). – Philip Hardie, *Rumour and Renown: Representations of Fama in Western Literature* (Cambridge 2012).
- James (2000). – Bryan James, Speech, Authority, and Experience in Caesar, *Bellum Gallicum* 1,39–41, *Hermes* 128 (2000) 54–64.
- Jervis (2001). – Alexa Jervis, *Images of Gauls and Romans in Caesar's Bellum Gallicum* (Diss. Pennsylvania 2001).
- Keegan (1976). – John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (New York 1976).

- Klotz (1950). – Alfred Klotz (ed.), *C. Iulius Caesar Commentarii. Vol. II: Commentarii Belli Civilis* (Leipzig 21950).
- Kraus (2009). – Christina Shuttleworth Kraus, *Bellum Gallicum*, in: Griffin (2009) 159–174.
- (2010). – Christina Shuttleworth Kraus, Speech and Silence in Caesar's *Bellum Gallicum*, in: D.H. Berry/Andrew Erskine (eds.), *Form and Function in Roman Oratory* (Cambridge 2010) 247–263.
- (2011). – Christina Shuttleworth Kraus, Caesar's Account of the Battle of Massilia (BC 1,34–2,22): Some Historiographical and Narratological Approaches, in: J. Marincola (ed.), *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography* (Chichester 2011) 371–378.
- Lendon (1999). – J.E. Lendon, The Rhetoric of Combat: Greek Military Theory and Roman Culture in Julius Caesar's Battle Descriptions, *CLAnt* 18 (1999) 273–329.
- Meusel (1887). – Heinrich Meusel, *Lexicon Caesarianum*, 2 vols. (Berlin 1887).
- Opelt (1980). – Ilona Opelt, „Töten“ und „Sterben“ in Caesars Sprache, *Glotta* 58 (1980) 103–119.
- Osgood (2009). – Josiah Osgood, The Pen and the Sword: Writing and Conquest in Caesar's Gaul, *Classical Antiquity* 28 (2009) 328–358.
- Peer (2015). – Ayelet Peer, *Julius Caesar's Bellum Civile and the Composition of a New Reality* (Farnham/Surrey [England]/Burlington [VT] 2015).
- Pelling (1981). – C.B.R. Pelling, Caesar's Battle-Descriptions and the Defeat of Ariovistus, *Latomus* 40 (1981) 741–766.
- Pontet (1900). – René du Pontet (ed.), *C. Iuli Caesaris Commentariorum Libri VII de Bello Gallico cum A. Hirti Supplemento* (Oxford 1900).
- Powell (1998). – Anton Powell, Julius Caesar and the Presentation of Massacre, in: Welch/Powell (1998) 111–137.
- Ramage (2001). – Edwin S. Ramage, The *Bellum Iustum* in Caesar's *De bello Gallico*, *Athenaeum* 89 (2001) 145–170.
- Rasmussen (1963). – Detlef Rasmussen, *Caesars Commentarii: Stil und Stilwandel am Beispiel der direkten Rede* (Göttingen 1963).
- Rawlings (1998). – Louis Rawlings, Caesar's Portrayal of Gauls as Warriors, in: Welch/Powell (1998) 171–192.
- Riggsby (2006). – Andrew M. Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome: War in Words* (Austin 2006).
- Sabin (2000). – Philip Sabin, The Face of Roman Battle, *JRS* 90 (2000) 1–17.
- Steinwender (1915). – Th. Steinwender, Zur Kohortentaktik, *RhM* 70 (1915) 416–440.

Ayelet Peer

- Timpe (1965). – Dieter Timpe, Caesars gallischer Krieg und das Problem des römischen Imperialismus, *Historia* 14 (1965) 189–214.
- Welch (1998). – Kathryn Welch, Caesar and His Officers in the Gallic War Commentaries, in: Welch/Powell (1998) 85–110.
- Welch/Powell (1998). – Kathryn Welch/Anton Powell (eds.), *Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments* (Swansea 1998).
- Wille (1967). – Günther Wille, *Musica Romana: Die Bedeutung der Musik im Leben der Römer* (Amsterdam 1967).